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Abstract 
Media piracy, in Malaysia, is organised through illicit negotiations between a dominant crime 
syndicate and consumers, street-corner gang leaders, the Malaysian police, custom officers and 
directors of the Malaysian Film Censorship Board. These key social actors who crossover class, 
race, religion, gang membership, and bridge porous legitimate and illegitimate commercial and 
political sectors of society establish a mutually collaborative relationship by negotiating their 
asymmetrical social capital, according to a conventional cost-benefit analysis. Contextual 
analyses of these illicit interactions identify criminal enterprise opportunities and plot the 
interactive progress of enterprise as it unfolds, against models of organisational and functional 
inter-connection. The dominant crime syndicate leader, whose perspective pervades this paper, 
strategically negotiates a cooperative relationship with corrupt regulators (1) to ensure the 
marketability of pirated films among consumers is unrivalled by legitimate suppliers, (2) to 
operate a profitable criminal enterprise that is uninterrupted by social control agents, and (3) to 
dominate the role of primary supplier of pirated DVDs and enforce order among other criminal 
groups within the illegitimate sector of society. In arguing the salience and specific business 
location of enterprise theory to appreciate organised crime and debunk normative theoretical 
frameworks of race, class, gender, this paper argues differing methodological frameworks to be a 
primary cause of the discordance. The ‘two-napkins’ methodology employed in this paper is 
shown to be more advantages over those of preceding studies where enterprise is the research 
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 1 
concern. Interactive variant analysis enables rather than confuse as it has in the past, 
understanding Asian organized crime as business. 
Key Words: media piracy, enterprise theory, porosity between legitimate and illegitimate sectors, 
‘two-napkins’ methodology 
Conversations with a crime boss: Doing Asian criminal 
business 
Introduction  
Why has the framework of enterprise theory that this paper asserts to be central 
to a holistic appreciation of criminal business, had limited exposure and recognition in 
the field of organised crime compared to preceding, normative criminology theories that 
rely on the analytical frameworks of biology, race, ethnicity, class or gender? In the 
process of answering this question, this paper delves into a critique of methodological 
frameworks that typically characterise studies of organised crime. It also reflects on the 
under-development of enterprise theory as an explanation for Asian crime business. 
The paper offers more than a new way of researching organised crime.  Its focus 
on the realities of Asian crime business, confirms the critical interdependence of theory 
and method when venturing understandings of criminal enterprise. Conventional 
dichotomies promoted in the white-collar and organised crime literature are broken 
down by re-imagining „insider/outsider theorising and by researching the „orderly‟ and 
innovative upper levels of criminal syndication as they engage with „legitimate‟ 
regulators. It is crucial to contextualise the methodological framework adopted in this 
paper against those of previous studies that endorse dichotomous and disorderly 
versions of criminal organisation and enterprise. Prior to proposing our new 
interpretations the paper engages with foundational orthodoxies, and explains their 
impact on the processes of data-collection as well as theorisation within unhelpful 
distinctions about legitimacy and order. We argue researching is theorising in the 
context of „ground-up‟ theory building and this recognition of the way the 
methodological framework determines and authorises theory require greater emphasis 
among qualitative researchers working in the field of organised crime. The perception 
that „insiders‟ or members of criminal organisations hold the key to knowledge of 
organised crime has systematically forced researchers of organised crime to adopt a 
method of enquiry that can be aptly described as „pigeonholing‟. Criminologists who 
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subscribe to the methodological implications of the „insider‟ versus „outsider‟ tend to 
emphasise the „insider‟ status of their informants despite the fact that the accessibility of 
these „insiders‟ is synonymous with their limited knowledge of criminal enterprise. Pre-
empting theory and pre-disposing method from a representational „insider‟/ „outsider‟ 
dichotomy, the paper establishes a holistic appreciation of organised crime. The wealth 
of knowledge possessed by „outsiders‟ in the form of corrupt regulators who associate 
with criminal enterprise but who are not official members of criminal organisations 
qualifies the constrained and conditional knowledge of low-ranking members of criminal 
organisations. As this paper shows, „outsiders‟ and „insiders‟ are both distracting and at 
the same time critically referential in an interactive context where criminal business at all 
levels constitutes a primary research focus. As a market-oriented enterprise within a 
global, capitalist context, organised crime must accordingly be appreciated as a 
lucrative, functional network of individuals (both leaders and followers) whose allegiance 
to profit and to advance criminal enterprise override the archaic allegiance to ascribed 
statuses. A revealing and realistic methodological framework must be able to educe the 
intricate features of organised crime to the forefront to serve as the foundation for 
sound theorisation. This section highlights ways in which the methodological framework 
for researching organised crime can be re-imagined to facilitate triangulation and 
validation of data and the reflexivity of theorisation. 
Through the refocused lens of enterprise theory, broadcast media piracy, 
irrespective of its criminality, empirically corresponds to a market-oriented trade and as 
such should be described in terms of economic processes and the social dynamics of the 
crime entrepreneurs who lead illegal businesses. Through contextual analyses of the 
illicit interactions that facilitate media piracy, this paper identifies particular criminal 
enterprise opportunities and therein plots the interactive progress of enterprise as it 
unfolds, against models of organisational and functional inter-connection (regardless of 
market and regulatory legitimacy). The unique dynamics of Asian crime business are 
accorded market reality through semi-structured interviews with the crime syndicate 
leader, and by observing the crime business between the syndicate and gang across the 
hierarchical organisational structure of both criminal entities. 
Using the media piracy case study, this paper first argues that the illicit 
negotiations between syndicate leaders and consumers at the micro level, street-corner 
 3 
gang leaders at the meso level and members of police and directors of the MFCB at the 
macro level is comprehensible through the framework of enterprise theory. 
Asian crime business 
Broadcast media piracy, in Malaysia, is empirically dependent on, and facilitated 
by illicit, negotiated intersections between consumers, a powerful crime syndicate and 
street-corner gang leaders, the Malaysian police, officers from the Malaysian customs 
department and the directors of the Malaysian Film Censorship Board (MFCB). These key 
social actors who crossover class, race, religion, gang membership, and bridge 
legitimate and illegitimate commercial and political sectors of society establish a 
collaborative relationship by negotiating their asymmetrical social capital, according to a 
conventional cost-benefit analysis. The cooperative relationship among these strategic 
social actors is essential for the advancement of broadcast media piracy as a national 
and international criminal enterprise.  
The case study around which this paper grows, reveals that the establishment, 
profitability and sustainability of media piracy is contingent on the dynamic interactions 
between commercial and regulatory „insiders‟ and „outsiders‟, and the porous boundary 
between the legitimate and illegitimate sectors of civil society. Negotiating collaboration 
with corrupt regulators, specifically the police, custom officers and directors of the MFCB 
is fundamental in enabling the dominant crime syndicate1 to function viably and 
handsomely to the realities of the market forces it serves. These market forces include, 
the logic of demand and supply, managing competing marketing strategies, price 
competition, risk minimisation, as well as regulation repositioning of the market by 
legitimate regulators. The later is not only crucial to market profitability but to market 
presence and share.  
Following an empirical illustration of the organisation of broadcast media piracy 
in Malaysia and Singapore, the analysis explores the impact of interactions among key 
players within the enterprise of piracy on the commercial and regulatory structures 
situated within the illegitimate sector of society. Establishing and maintaining an alliance 
with corrupt regulators force the crime syndicate leader to adopt an organisational 
                                                          
1
 The ‘crime boss’ who is the informant central to my ethno-methodological project controls this 
syndicate. 
 
 4 
structure that is especially conducive to operating an ordered and functional criminal 
enterprise. In contrast, the Omega gang2, a recently established street gang trading in 
similar commodities is unable to secure the cooperation of corrupt law enforcers and 
regulators. Consequently, members of the Omega gang regularly suffer regulatory 
sanctions and discretionary policing by corrupt social control agents, which hinder the 
gang‟s orderly and organised pursuit of, and involvement in the enterprise of media 
piracy. As a strategy to cash in on the media piracy trade, and to avoid being reduced to 
a „retreatist‟ gang in comparison to more successful crime players, Omega‟s leaders 
negotiate a subordinate position relative to the syndicate to secure a minor role in the 
piracy enterprise. In this way, Omega receives a financial slice of the trade and the 
patronage of the syndicate without disrupting the commercial stability of either criminal 
entity. Omega at a micro level however, remains exposed to the violent incursion of 
competitors in the form of other gangs intent on „pirating‟ their piece of the trade.3   
The minor commercial role of Omega relative to the syndicate, within the piracy 
trade, takes the form of the gang franchising syndicate-produced digital versatile discs 
(DVDs) and video compact discs (VCDs) in Singapore. More importantly, the 
asymmetrical dependence of Omega on the syndicate induces an illegitimate trading 
framework that is orderly and functionally integrated. In this respect, the parallels 
between illegitimate business and legitimate trading enterprise become graphic. Orderly 
commerce prevails and violence becomes relegated to gang relations on the periphery of 
market servicing struggles rather than trading supremacy or regulator resistance. 
The detailed description and resultant understanding of the organisation of 
broadcast piracy in Malaysia derive from participant observation and semi-structured, in-
depth interviews conducted with members of the Malaysian police, a syndicate leader 
and members of the Omega gang operating from the state of Kuala Lumpur. Over a 
period of about three years, we conducted an ethnographic study of the Omega gang 
based on data gathered from members who occupy various ranks throughout the gang‟s 
                                                          
2
  Omega and its members has been an ethnomethodological focus for earlier research by the author, 
both within and outside Singapore prison environments. 
 
3
 In Singapore, Omega’s franchises of syndicate-produced pirated materials are frequently disrupted by 
members of established Chinese secret societies like ‘Sio Kun Tong’, ‘Salakao’ and ‘Sio Ji Hio’, who wage 
inter-gang wars against Omega in an attempt to extort a share of the lucrative media piracy enterprise.  
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hierarchical structure, from the leaders through to the foot-soldiers, both within the 
context of the prison and the „free community‟ (Hanif, 2008b). In contrast to the extent 
of fieldwork conducted with Omega members and the depth of data that has been 
gathered about the structural organisation, criminal activities, ideologies of the Omega 
gang and its interaction in relation to other criminal entities within the illegitimate sector 
of Malaysian and Singapore society, data-collection with the syndicate leader is relatively 
recent. Qualitative data-gathering with the leader of the syndicate, which can be aptly 
described as conversational, was undertaken over a period of five months between 
October of 2008 and February of 2009, in the Malaysian state of Kuala Lumpur. 
Although the syndicate leader operates from Kuala Lumpur, the criminal activities 
pursued by the syndicate leader are transnational in nature. During participant 
observation in nightclubs owned by the syndicate leader, we gained an insight into the 
cooperation negotiated between the syndicate leader and members of the police. As 
well, this research method was able to engage some of these police officers in snatched 
and informal conversation about their collaboration with the syndicate leader. 
Since empirical data touched on throughout the paper functions as the basis for 
advancing the theoretical framework of enterprise to understand criminal business and 
organised crime, the first section details the organisation of piracy within the Malaysian 
state of Kuala Lumpur. Moving on from the organisation of the piracy trade, this paper 
addresses the way the organisation of piracy among key social actors at a micro level 
imparts an orderly and functionally integrated structure to the illegitimate sector of 
society. The porous boundaries between the legitimate and illegitimate sectors of 
society, the cooperation among social actors threading the two spheres of society to 
advance criminal enterprise and their impact on structuring the illegitimate sector of 
society to be conducive to enterprise challenge preceding understanding and 
presentation of Asian organised crime. In the subsequent section that attempts to 
account for the discordance between this paper‟s presentation and theorisation of Asian 
organised crime and that of preceding studies, differing methodological frameworks is 
isolated as a primary cause of the discordance. Subsequently this paper compares the 
methodological framework of preceding studies against the „two-napkins‟ methodological 
framework employed in this paper to demonstrate the advantages of the later over the 
former within a context where enterprise is the research concern. Using the „two 
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napkins‟ methodological framework, this paper finally argues for a re-positioning of 
existing enterprise theory in order to facilitate an understanding of Asian organised 
crime that is consistent with empirical data that has been gathered.   
 
Enhancing enterprise theory 
In a “spectrum-based theory of enterprise”, Smith (1980: 361) argues that the 
institutionalisation of the dichotomy, business versus crime, through our terminology 
and statistical categories blinds us to the legal-illegal continuum of enterprise. Smith and 
others have done a great service by debunking this useless and misleading framework 
that still afflicts many and to proceed with a call for a “spectrum-based theory of 
enterprise” (1980: 369). Only with a spectrum-based theory can we understand the 
nature and range of business operations and replace the hoary taxonomy of „legal‟ 
versus „illegal‟ which Smith has adduced and debunked (Martin, 1981). Smith thus has 
taken several giant leaps toward a realistic and potentially bountiful understanding of 
criminal enterprise and enterprise in general. Enterprise theory, rather than grappling 
with diverse and complex empirical data in an attempt to conceptualise or define 
„organised crime‟, has induced current literature to shift their analytical focus from 
explanations of what organised crime is toward building theories of the organisation of 
serious crimes (Gambetta, 1993; van Duyne, 1993; Paoli, 2002; Hill, 2003; Levi, 2008).  
Its economic aspects are most evident at present. The common thread in current 
research, around which a new paradigm appears to be forming (as a substitute for both 
differential association and the alien phenomenon paradigm) is the effort to relate 
concepts of enterprise and entrepreneurship to existing knowledge about organised 
crime (Smith, 1980: 360; see also van Duyne, 1993, Antonopoulos, 2008). This boils 
down to an argument over what constitutes the necessary relations for the commission 
of serious crimes for economic gain, and how their contingent concentration in certain 
places and moments amongst particular populations can be adequately explained. This 
also suggests that the interplay between more remote `distal' causes, situational 
opportunities presented by public and private sector controls, and pre-existing networks 
of relationships have to be understood in combination for an adequate explanatory 
account of the organization of crimes (Edwards and Levi, 2008; see also Ruggiero and 
Khan, 2007; Levi, 2008;). In this paper, the cost-benefit rationale primarily motivates 
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and incites the cooperative relationships that syndicate leaders successfully negotiate 
with consumers, the police and directors of the MFCB within the context of the piracy 
enterprise. By proposing the framework of enterprise to understand criminal business, I 
extricate Asian criminal business from, and expose the analytically barren theoretical 
frameworks of sub-cultural mythology, strain and discourses of race and racialisation. 
Such a proposal challenges preceding studies of Asian criminal enterprise that 
normatively emphasise class, race, religion, gang membership and the legitimate and 
illegitimate sectors of society as key indicators to explain organised crime.  
Operating according to the logic of a market-oriented enterprise, broadcast 
media piracy is empirically ordered and functional, in supply and demand terms. The 
paper suggests that understanding criminal business through the framework of 
enterprise is antithetical to preceding analyses of Asian criminal business that are 
systematically embedded in the theoretical perspectives of anomie and strain, 
subcultural mythology and discourses of race and racialisation. These preceding 
theoretical perspectives consistently emphasise the themes of disorder and dysfunction. 
Disorder and dysfunction are epitomised in the individualistic assumptions of positivist 
destine, theorising collective criminal entities as loose associations of individuals afflicted 
with either biological or psychological deficiencies. These characteristics supposedly 
predispose collective criminal entities towards unreservedly pursuing sadism, deviant or 
criminal acts within the contexts of their organisation and enterprise. Disorder and 
dysfunction in the writing of symbolic interactionists ensue from the deviant and/or 
criminal behaviour that members of collective criminal entities participate in and glorify 
to overcome their stigma and gain status. Disorder, dysfunction and unstable 
organisational conditions are essentialized features of collective criminal entities. From 
the perspective of „strain‟ theorists, as a corollary of the irrationality and the 
individualism, such entities characterise the innovators‟ pursuit of deviant and 
disorganised entrepreneurial aspirations.  
The organisation of the illegitimate Malaysian market for the sale and distribution 
of pirated materials serves as a foundation to argue the pertinence of enterprise theory 
in rendering „Asian organised crime/criminal business‟ comprehensible. The mechanism 
that drives the piracy trade marked by the interaction between gangs, syndicate and 
corrupt regulators are a consequence of the demands of the market-oriented enterprise 
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of piracy. As a market-oriented enterprise, piracy is subject to the realities of the market 
forces it serves including consumer demands and satisfaction, managing competing 
marketing strategies, price competition, risk and regulation of the market by legitimate 
regulators. In the Malaysian state of Kuala Lumpur (KL) and Johor Bahru (JB), the 
market for sale and distribution of pirated copies of latest Hollywood and Bollywood film 
releases on DVDs is a multi-billion dollar enterprise.4 Piracy is lucrative because the 
enterprise capitalises on and augments the culturally determined market taste of 
Malaysians and neighbouring Singaporeans for access to the latest Hollywood, 
Bollywood and Chinese movie releases on DVDs at a lesser price but of equally good 
quality, as those offered by legitimate avenues. Cinemas and movie rental and retail 
outlets, suppliers that also target consumer demand for latest Hollywood, Bollywood and 
Chinese movie releases on DVDs, are two dominant legitimate institutions that pose 
competition to the marketability of pirated DVDs. To ensure the marketability of pirated 
DVDs against the pull factors posed by these legitimate institutions, the syndicate leader 
embarks on a series of strategies. Strategies employed by the crime syndicate leader 
include ensuring the price, quality and accessibility of their product, emphasising 
consumer ownership and the absence of any negative repercussions for consumers of 
pirated materials.5 Cumulatively, these consumer-oriented marketing strategies are 
                                                          
4
 A week prior to its official release throughout Malaysia and Singapore on 17 July 2008, the syndicate 
leader claims to have released to consumers, and sold nearly half a million, pirated DVDs of Christopher 
Nolan’s highly acclaimed ‘The Dark Knight’. Starring Hollywood’s veteran actors like Christian Bale, 
Morgan Freeman, Gary Oldman, and rising stars Maggie Gyllenhaal, and the late Heath Ledger, pirated 
DVDs of The Dark Knight raked in about 10 million ringgit during the first week of sales in Malaysia and 
Singapore alone. Sales records of The Dark Knight continued to soar after the movie’s official premiere 
and combined with the sales of pirated DVDs exported to Latin America, Africa, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, China, and India, the syndicate leader estimated a profit of about 250 million 
USD within the first 4 months of national and international sales.  
[Fieldwork notes dated 31 October 2008] 
 
5
 This is succinctly encapsulated in the excerpt below by the crime syndicate leader: 
‘When customers approach my guys, they know they can buy cinema-quality DVDs of the latest 
Hollywood, Bollywood and Chinese movies at only seven ringgit each. Cinemas and rentals can’t beat that. 
Going to the cinema, you’re looking at forking out 17 ringgit per ticket and maybe another 10 for popcorn 
and drinks, 4 times more expensive than one pirated DVD. Places like VideoEzy sell outdated movies on 
DVDs for 42 ringgit. For that money, people can buy 6 different movies. There’s always some new movie 
and people cannot afford the cinema or VideoEzy and so they come looking for us. Without compromising 
quality, pirated DVDs are unrivalled value for money and that’s why customers are loyal to us. 
Singaporeans drive across the causeway to buy 15 to 20 DVDs at a time. And nowadays, pirated DVDs 
spring up like food stalls, they’re everywhere, not in some back alley but out in the open. People don’t 
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unrivalled by the suppliers within the legitimate market. The local film and music 
businesses suffer, and local legitimate CD manufacturers find it difficult to compete on 
price with producers that violate copyright law. Securing these consumer-oriented 
marketing strategies is dependent upon the negotiated collaboration between the 
syndicate leader, street-corner gang leaders and corrupt regulators. 
A normatively unencumbered market perspective enables an appreciation of 
Asian organised crime as much from the perspective of the discriminating consumer, 
than focusing on criminal traders or corrupt regulators.  Consumers in the pirated video 
market neutralise their involvement against competitive pricing, recurrent and transient 
acquisition, and the normalcy of the trading profile. The „piracy‟ of the product is 
subsumed beneath the commonality of demand and the openness of supply. 
A cross-sectional view of piracy emphasises the dynamic interactions between 
„insiders‟ and „outsiders‟ and the porous boundary between the legitimate and 
illegitimate sectors of society as fundamental to lucrative criminal business. Conventional 
approaches to such dichotomous interactions fail to include the supply/demand dynamic.  
Certainly, with this video piracy case study the consumer and the supplier are deeply 
embedded in the same market enterprise, which they similarly normalise in cost benefit 
terms. The unique market context, comprising duplicitous regulatory mechanisms and 
equivocal consumer tastes and practices injects the local/cultural quality into the 
business sphere. 6 In this regard, if society or the state countenances violence, considers 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fear going to jail for buying pirated DVDs or Gucci bags. You know what would be abnormal? If people 
come to Malaysia and cannot find any pirated DVD stalls.’ [Fieldwork notes dated 31 October 2008] 
 
6
 According to the crime syndicate leader: 
‘Corruption is the keystone of every successful business in Malaysia, legitimate or illegitimate. Hard work 
comes second. Businesses that cannot cater to corruption are doomed. For pirated DVDs to be accessible 
to the public, piracy must function in broad daylight like any other business. If the police want to play a 
dirty game, they have the power to disrupt the profitability and stability of the piracy trade. Failure to 
provide bribes to the police will certainly seal the fate of my business. Police officers can wave their badge 
and raid all my stalls and factories, confiscate the products and the expensive computers used to produce 
pirated DVDs, throw my men in jail and impose fines on my customers to deter them from buying my 
goods. Custom officers at the border can frighten away consumers if they enforce the law and make it 
very difficult for me to export my DVDs overseas. To run a stable business, I need the help of the police, 
custom officers especially the high-ranking officials. High-ranking police officials can manipulate the 
system and refuse to enforce the law. These officials have the power to command their subordinates to 
overlook the piracy business, to overlook consumers’ purchases, to facilitate export of pirated DVDs out 
of Malaysia and so on. Corrupt officers are the backbone of successful criminal enterprise.’  
[Fieldwork notes dated 7 November 2008] 
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personal gain to be more important than equity, and is willing to see the law distorted in 
the pursuit of wealth and power, then such a society or state itself will always be 
receptive to illicit enterprise whether condoned, ignored or condemned. Such enterprise 
will become a reality whenever groups of people are willing to take advantage of 
entrepreneurial opportunities that entail selective law enforcement, violence and 
corruption to achieve commercial gain (Fiorentini & Peltzman, 1995). 
Black-market trading will not necessarily normalise against competitive pricing 
alone. Within the context of a market where suppliers compete to meet the single 
demand of consumers for access to the latest Hollywood, Bollywood and Chinese film 
releases, the low retail price of pirated DVDs is insufficient to ensure its dominating 
marketability over legitimate competitors. This is especially salient when considering the 
piracy enterprise in the southernmost Malaysian state of JB. Southern JB shares a 
border with Singapore and the weekly influx of Singaporeans in JB for the purposes of 
shopping, entertainment and dining, incited by the stronger Singapore Dollar compared 
to Malaysian Ringgit, encourages street-corner gangs to set up countless shops in 
department stores, bazaar booths and roadside stalls to flood consumers with cheap 
pirated DVDs. Both Malaysian and Singaporean consumers however avoid purchasing 
these cheap pirated DVDs in certain areas of southern JB, specifically stores in Holiday 
Plaza, Danga Mall, Komtar shopping centre and the roadside stalls surrounding those 
areas, because of their extremely poor quality.7. Through oral publicity and trial and 
error, consumers acquire and disseminate information that distinguishes geographical 
areas that supply pirated DVDs of excellent, mediocre and poor quality. This consumer 
tactic compromises the marketability of poor quality pirated DVDs in certain areas of 
southern JB.8  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
7
 Produced through direct recordings from cinemas, pirated DVDs sold in these areas are visually unclear 
due to the dark ambience of cinemas and often interrupted by the chattering, laughter, coughing and 
movements of audience. 
 
8
 The pirated optical discs sold by Omega members are produced mainly through direct recordings from 
cinema on mobile phones and video cameras. During an interview session, one of the leaders of Omega 
gang revealed the arduousness of pushing the sales of Omega-produced pirated discs within a context 
where high-grade quality pirated discs produced by the syndicate simultaneously exists. This is summed 
up below: 
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Another issue crucial to consumer incorporation and normalcy is the location of 
the trade.  The purchase of pirated product loses its „black-market‟ appearance with 
pirated DVDs on offer in outlets within legitimate shopping precincts.  Along with this is 
weak cross border regulation at points of entry into Malaysia associated with the 
relatively small value of the product should confiscation occur. 
The nature of the market and the enterprise that services its demands require 
several important enterprise dynamics: 
1. The essence of regulatory cross-over 
The cooption of regulators into the illegitimate market has become essential not 
only for its profitability and practicality, but to its persistence and normalcy. The 
inextricability of consumer satisfaction from the profit-oriented enterprise of piracy 
necessitates syndicate leaders to exercise quality control over their product in order to 
ensure customer satisfaction, an expanding clientele and high profit margins. Since the 
production of high quality pirated DVDs, marked by visual and sound clarity, is 
systematically achievable only by duplicating original copies of new films released to the 
MFCB, a ministry of the Malaysian government in charge of vetting all films, it is an 
impetus for syndicate leaders to initiate negotiations with the directors of the MFCB. 
From the perspective of the criminal syndicate, the process of negotiating the interests 
of the directors of MFCB in order to obtain original copies of new film releases is of 
paramount importance to ensure a lucrative enterprise of piracy, unlike that in southern 
JB.  
To minimise the risks inherent in pursuing a cooperative relationship with the 
criminal syndicate, directors of the MFCB institute a two-pronged approach to safeguard 
                                                                                                                                                                             
‘Piracy is a damn big business and everyone wants to cash in. You get a story everyday in the papers about 
group of friends, individuals, old couples, all trying to cash in. However, buyers do not just want to buy 
pirated DVDs, they want good quality ones. That is hard to produce. Our products are usually taken from 
the cinema on handphones (mobile phones) or video cameras that are snuck into the cinema by our 
members. The bad thing is you get the laughter, people’s heads, chatting, sound of people eating and 
buyers tend not to like that. They won’t come back to us anymore. Buyers are smart and they know that 
in Petaling Street, they can get excellent quality DVDs at a very low price. The difference is that those 
syndicates are rich enough to strike deals to get better quality DVDs. At best, what Omega can afford is to 
bribe to get a private screening of movies in the cinema. We don’t have high-quality computers to better 
the quality of our goods and our members are not specialist in IT. So it’s really tough for Omega to cash in 
on the piracy business.’ 
[Fieldwork notes dated 11 October 2008] 
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the secrecy of their role in the enterprise of piracy. In reasoning a cooperative 
relationship with the leader of the criminal syndicate, directors of the MFCB struggle 
between a myriad of pull and push factors. Pull factors for the directors of the MFCB 
include a pecuniary benefit that potentially translates into an opportunity to campaign 
for politics thus elevating their socio-economic status. Each sale of original copies of the 
latest Hollywood, Bollywood and Chinese film releases to syndicate leaders earns the 
directors of the MFCB about half a million U.S. dollars. Factors that deter directors of the 
MFCB relate to possible legal prosecution that will inevitably compromise their 
reputations and their profession. To deflect the attention of non-corrupt social control 
agents from the piracy venture, directors of the MFCB adopt two strategies, one indirect 
and another direct. The indirect strategy relate to directors of the MFCB withholding the 
sale of original copies of Malaysian produced films to syndicate leaders to evade 
potential discontent from members of the Malaysian film industry, whose proximity to 
the piracy enterprise will inevitably compel police investigations and legal investigations. 
Worldwide, piracy has caused the Hollywood, Bollywood and Chinese film industries to 
suffer severe economic losses and this has led members of those film industries to 
pressure social control agents to declare war on piracy by toughening the laws against 
the perpetrators of piracy (Wang, 2003; Pang, 2006). A second, more direct strategy to 
promote their interests at minimal risk involves directors of the MFCB negotiating a 
monetary incentive to elicit cooperative relationship with high-ranking officers of the 
Malaysian police to execute five crucial aims. In accepting the financial offer from the 
directors of the MFCB, these police officials thus establish their cooperative and 
facilitative role in the enterprise of piracy. Police officials exercise their cooperative and 
facilitative role in the piracy venture by executing the following aims drafted by directors 
of the MFCB:  
 to overlook the illicit relationship between the syndicate leaders and the directors 
of the MFCB, which facilitates the enterprise of piracy and violates copyright law,  
 to engage subordinate police officers to exercise a gaze over the sale and 
distribution of pirated copies of films to ascertain that Malaysian produced films 
are excluded from the black-market without impinging on the piracy enterprise,  
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 to either confirm or present evidence to contradict the syndicate leader‟s 
contractual agreement with the directors of the MFCB to exclude Malaysian 
produced films from the black-market, and 
 to exploit their rank, status and authority to eliminate potential disruptions posed 
by other criminal entities that attempt to subvert the arrangement among the 
syndicate, directors of the film censorship board and the police.   
Asymmetrical power relations and the „pervasiveness of a corrupt police culture in 
Malaysia‟ (Quah, 2006)  ensures that the illicit standing order issued by police officials to 
subordinate policemen to overlook the enterprise of piracy and to indirectly abet the 
criminal enterprise by reporting the sale of Malaysian produced films is complied with. 
Majority of subordinate police officers strategically exploit their authority and status as 
police officers relative to the members of criminal syndicates peddling pirated DVDs to 
procure a small portion of financial for themselves. Unable to expose the involvement of 
their superiors in the enterprise of piracy without risking the loss of their job, which for 
many is an only source of livelihood, subordinate policemen capitalise on their status 
and authority to harass subordinate syndicate members at the micro-level to elicit some 
pecuniary benefit.9  
As mentioned above, despite their attractive price and excellent quality, 
additional factors that impact on the marketability of pirated DVDs include the degree of 
accessibility of pirated DVDs and the degree of risk that potentially confronts its 
consumer. The accessibility of, and risk associated with purchasing and marketing 
pirated DVDs are determined by the culture of law enforcement agents in Malaysia. In 
Malaysia, the low wages of Malaysian police officers is primarily responsible for the 
pervasiveness of a corrupt police culture, which is one of the nation‟s biggest obstacles 
against crime-prevention strategies (Quah, 2006). Syndicate leaders exploit this corrupt 
police culture to facilitate the enterprise of piracy. A tangible economic incentive, 
although extremely appealing to poorly paid police officials, is not the sole factor that 
                                                          
9
 While in conversation with a police inspector in Kuala Lumpur, it was revealed that subordinate police 
officers “are not stupid to engage in the dangerous and futile endeavour of exposing the collaboration of 
high-ranking police officials in the piracy business.” Potential “troublemakers” are deterred because any 
attempt to expose police corruption inevitably “results in the emergence of evidence to implicate these 
troublemakers in corruption charges, who will subsequently be fired and jailed.” 
 
 14 
secures police cooperation with criminal syndicates in the piracy venture. Of equal 
importance are the intangible benefits offered by syndicate leaders. In exchange for 
their protection over the piracy enterprise and its main players, police officials are able 
to exact help and information from syndicate leaders and members to solve crimes and 
exercise order within the illegitimate sector of Malaysian society.10 
2. Enterprise restructuring as a consequence of differential cross-over – Franchising 
street gangs 
Through indirect, profit-maximising strategy, syndicate leaders exploit police 
cooperation in the piracy enterprise to ensure their dominant role as suppliers of pirated 
DVDs within the illegitimate sector of society and maximum reach of their product to 
consumers. This indirect strategy is akin to franchising. Criminal syndicates that 
successfully secure police protection over the piracy enterprise are able to operate an 
uninterrupted criminal enterprise. In contrast, criminal organisations that fail to secure 
the cooperation of corrupt regulators, mostly street-corner gangs, are exposed to the 
regulatory sanctions of social control agents, which interrupt their stable, effective 
involvement in criminal enterprises. In order to secure some form of economic gain from 
the piracy enterprise, these street-corner gangs negotiate a subordinate cooperation 
with criminal syndicates that are economically stable because of their cooperation with 
corrupt regulators. Leaders of Omega, a street-corner gang operating in Singapore, 
offers the Malaysian syndicate leader a portion of their profits for the right to market 
syndicate produced pirated DVDs throughout various locations like train stations, bus 
stations and housing estates in Singapore. Syndicate leaders benefit economically form 
the „royalty‟ paid by street-corner gangs who market their products within Malaysia as 
well as internationally.11 Of greater intangible importance, franchising highlights the 
                                                          
10
 The crime syndicate leader reveals as follows: 
‘The police benefit as much as we benefit from them. This is a business deal and they are not one to lose 
out. The police here can overlook everything as long as the coffee-money (bribe) is sufficient. This is 
extremely advantageous to us because as long as the syndicate can fork out money, we can basically carry 
on business as usual. But the police don’t just stop at the money. They take advantage of us too. When 
they need information about some criminal gang, some big kidnap or murder, they look to us to tell them 
what we know. The information we provide is valuable to the police to assist them in solving crimes and 
looking good to the public.’ 
[Fieldwork notes dated 13 November 2008] 
 
11
 According to one of the leaders of Omega: 
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asymmetrical reliance of economically unstable street-corner gangs on stable criminal 
syndicates. This asymmetrical reliance of street-corner gangs on syndicates gives rise to 
a hierarchical structure and order of the illegitimate sector of society dominated by 
syndicate leaders.  
3. Market differentiation to comfort cross-over 
Contextual analyses of negotiated cooperation among interest groups within the 
piracy venture, referring to syndicate leaders, police officials, directors of the MFCB, are 
functional from a cost-benefit analysis. Despite the failure to negotiate the procurement 
of Malaysian produced films, syndicate leaders appreciate the impetus to avoid piracy of 
Malaysian produced films in order to distance the criminal enterprise from legal attention 
and prosecutions. More importantly the procurement of original copies of the latest 
Hollywood, Bollywood and Chinese film from directors of the MFCB secures for syndicate 
leaders the low price, quality and marketability of their pirated DVDs over that of their 
competitors, without any serious compromise to their ability to appeal to the consumers. 
To overcome the competition posed by legitimate institutions and rapidly sprouting 
piracy ventures within the illegitimate sector of society, syndicate leaders strategise 
consumer appeal by striking a balance between the price and quality of their pirated 
DVDs. Although the purchasing price of each original copy of latest film releases from 
directors of the MFCB at about half a million U.S. dollars seems staggering, syndicate 
leaders are perceptive of the high profit turnover of this investment, considering the 
relatively low cost of producing pirated DVDs for export throughout Malaysia as well as 
internationally.12  
                                                                                                                                                                             
‘Omega is a new group and we do not have enough resources to negotiate the collaboration of authority 
figures and we do not have much money to invest in factories, equipments, workers to carry on the piracy 
business. Therefore, we have to negotiate middleman position with the syndicate. We take syndicate-
produced pirated discs across the causeway into Singapore. We sell these pirated discs at all the housing 
estates, train stations, bus stations and some old shops. The syndicate leader charges us 4 SGD per disc and 
we then sell the pirated discs for about 8 SGD to the Singaporeans. We’re dependent on the syndicate for 
their products because buyers like their products and will continue buying. And some of them just don’t 
want to get caught in causeway traffic so we make pirated DVDs accessible to them in Singapore.’ 
[Fieldwork notes dated 18 October 2008] 
 
12
 The importance of negotiating a collaborative relationship with directors of the MFCB in order to 
advance the syndicate’s role in enterprise of piracy over other competitors is succinctly encapsulated in the 
excerpt below by the crime syndicate leader: 
‘Piracy is a type of business which requires a small capital but which has the potential for a high profit 
turnover. That is the reason people are so attracted to get involved in this business. You see piracy business 
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The case study of piracy in Malaysia provides the context for the emergence and 
activation of criminal enterprise. Illicit interactions that facilitate piracy empirically 
involve various interest groups, referring to consumers, syndicate leaders, directors of 
MFCB, police officials, negotiating their asymmetrically aligned social capital in order to 
avert potential risks and maximise the potential rewards. A pivotal way of understanding 
the engineering behind „organised crime‟ therefore, is through the cumulative contextual 
analysis of these illicit interactions through the framework of enterprise theory. As such, 
the contextual analyses of these illicit interactions are the rigor for the semi-structured 
interviews with key syndicate and regulator players. In this section, the case study of 
piracy is a prelude to advance the enterprise theory for interpreting the nature and 
progression of Asian criminal business. 
 
Market regulation or law enforcement? – Boundaries of illegitimate 
trading 
Despite promising legislation to guarantee protection for intellectual property and 
widespread crackdowns by Malaysian authorities and the motion picture industry, DVD 
piracy expands at an exponential rate that would make many legitimate corporations 
envious, making it one of Asia‟s great growth industries (Smith and Urbas, 2001; Sesser, 
2004). Attempting to counter the pervasiveness of DVD piracy through a meticulous 
scrutiny of the process of manufacturing compact discs, Dewan Rakyat or the House of 
Representatives in the Malaysian Parliament passed „The Optical Discs Act‟ in 2000. The 
Optical Discs Act empowers a wide range of government authorities, police inspectors, 
the Minister for Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs and the Minister-appointed office 
                                                                                                                                                                             
everywhere in Malaysia. When the police kill 10 businesses, almost 100 other businesses pop up instantly. 
Computers are accessible to almost everyone, poor quality re-writable CDs are so cheap and the production 
of pirated DVDs is a low-skill operation that even grandmother and grandfathers are doing. For the 
syndicate to rise above its competitors, it needs to surpass the weakness of other competitors. The quality of 
syndicate-produced pirated discs are unrivalled by its competitors because we do not record movies directly 
from cinemas or youtube or other online sources. We produce our pirated discs by obtaining high-quality 
originals from directors of the MFCB. Only the MFCB directors can offer us cinema quality original 
movies without any interruptions. They are key to our success. The syndicate does not compromise on 
quality despite its low price. Our customers are loyal because they know they’re getting a good deal and 
they keep coming back. They buy 10 to 20 copies at any one time because they trust our products. They 
won’t do that if they’re buying in Komtar or Danga bay. They may buy 1 or 2. Because other competitors 
cannot afford to negotiate a deal with the MFCB directors, the syndicate peaks over other businesses.’ 
[Fieldwork notes dated 1 November 2008] 
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of the Controller, Deputy Controller, assistant Controllers of optical discs, to monitor all 
aspects of compact disc production in local factories, from licensing of imported 
machines and materials to distribution. The Act further stipulates that factory operators 
convicted of pirating compact discs be sentenced to a maximum of RM 500, 000 fine, or 
five years jail. In 2001, Deputy Minister for Domestic Trade and Consumer Affair, 
targeted optical disc plants producing cheap compact discs to meet the demands of 
music and movie pirates. Although legitimate demand for blank compact discs estimated 
in 2001 to be less than 20 million units, plants in Malaysia manufactured nearly 300 
million units (Lau, 2001). Regardless of tough measures to suppress the enterprise of 
piracy, Ghani (2003) asserts that KL is becoming an export hub for pirated DVDs and 
VCDs via the internet, catering to big orders from North America, Europe, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa.  
The imperviousness of the enterprise of piracy in Malaysia to the myriad of legal 
and law enforcement strategies aimed at deterring consumers, criminal organisations, 
and legitimate businesses that cater to the demands of pirates, is conditional upon the 
surreptitious alliance of corrupt regulators like Malaysian police and custom officers in 
criminal enterprise. The power and authority legitimately invested in police and custom 
officers to exercise border patrol, to guard the flow of illicit commodities and services 
between boundaries and to enforce the law constantly situates these social control 
agents at the intersection between the legitimate and illegitimate spheres of society. It 
also makes this situation an individually and organisationally profitable market regulator 
(see also Quah, 2006: 61). The way these social control agents exercise their power and 
authority at an everyday level, to a large extent, determines the boundary between the 
illegitimate and legitimate sector of society, whether porous or impermeable, which 
subsequently affects the flow of illicit goods and services between the two spheres of 
society.  More than this, through corruption these agents become facilitators of the 
illegitimate market more than differential or weak regulators of the legitimate market.  
And market division blurs as profit possibilities ebb and flow. 
A direct relationship between the rank of a social control agent and his ability to 
determine the boundary between the legitimate and illegitimate sector of society is 
evident from the organisation of piracy. Consequently, securing the functional alliance of 
the various offices of these social control agents is critical to the economic productivity 
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of criminal enterprise. These offices include, Inspector General Police of Malaysia, Police 
Commissioners, Inspectors and Superintendents in charge of criminal investigations in 
the various districts of KL, Chief Director of the department of audit, taxation, import 
and export of the Malaysian Customs and officers working the borders between Malaysia 
and Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand.  By successfully negotiating an alliance with 
these various offices within the Malaysian police and customs and excise department, 
the syndicate leader tactically shields the enterprise of piracy from the potential 
economically compromising effects of various legal strategies. In saying this, it is 
necessary to drill deeper into the characteristics of crossover as a market regulator: 
a. Normalising potentials of corrupt regulation 
Appreciating corruption among social control agents as a pervasive and 
normalized feature of Malaysian society is an important recognition and an indispensable 
factor in explaining the persistence of organised crime in Malaysia. The Report of the 
Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysia 
Police found that “corruption regrettably has swept through, in varying degrees, all 
levels of the service” of the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) (Royal Malaysia Police 2005: 
277). More specifically, the Royal Commission found that the following divisions in the 
RMP were “more susceptible to corrupt practices”, namely “traffic police personnel, 
investigating officers and their supervisors, detectives, prosecuting officers and police 
enquiry office personnel” (Royal Malaysia Police 2005: 279). Another finding was that 
corruption was “prevalent in the police lockup as many complainants alleged that 
detainees had to 'pay' for additional food, to receive and make phone calls, to see family 
members or friends and to be placed in 'good' cells” (Royal Malaysia Police 2005: 280). 
Finally, it was common for police officers “to bribe other officers to gain an advantage 
such as being transferred to 'gold mine' postings” such as the “Commercial Crime 
Department, Traffic Branch, Criminal Investigation Department (D7 covering secret 
societies, anti-vice and gambling), Narcotics Department, Logistics Department 
(Procurement and Development) and Deployment and Promotions Division” (Royal 
Malaysia Police 2005: 280 cited in Quah, 2006: 60-61). 
A symbiotic relationship between various offices of the Malaysian police and the 
syndicate leader is vital to the optimal functioning of criminal enterprise, which 
transpires through the case study of piracy. This is best illustrated through an example 
 19 
recapped by the crime syndicate leader. In 2003, the Motion Picture Association (MPA) 
and the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) isolated Petaling Street, 
Gombak and Setiawangsa as three major pirate retail sites in KL for Hollywood, 
Bollywood and Chinese films and pressured the police commissioner of KL to raid these 
locations. In order to portray the incorruptible image of the Malaysian police and 
promote Malaysia as aggressively combating piracy to international bodies like the MPA 
and the IIPA, while maintaining their clandestine cooperation in the enterprise of piracy, 
the police commissioner of KL and the syndicate leader negotiated the terms for staging 
three „successful raids‟. The way police officers negotiate their power, authority and 
specialised knowledge is integral to the sustainability of criminal enterprise. Negotiations 
between the police commissioner of KL and the syndicate leader to plan three 
„successful raids‟ addressed the following details: 
(1) the specific factories that the international bodies, MPA and IIPA, had isolated in 
Petaling Street, Gombak and Setiawangsa in KL to be raided; 
(2) appropriate timing for these raiding operations that would allow the syndicate 
leader sufficient amount of time to remove the bulk of his property and ensure 
the re-assignment of important personnel from these factories, without 
compromising the image of Malaysian police as prompt actors to alerts provided 
by the MPA; and 
(3) the degree of loss, in terms of  arrests of pirates, the confiscation of pirated 
DVDs and information technology (IT) equipments for the piracy trade that the 
syndicate leader is willing to incur, in rough accordance to the expectations of 
the MPA, to avert suspicions of police corruption. 
b. „Soft labelling and normalising the market through selective micro regulation 
At an everyday level, the economically lucrative enterprise of piracy, as 
consistently affirmed by published articles in Malaysian newspapers like Business Times, 
New Straits Times and The Malay Mail, inevitably incites individuals, groups of friends, 
families, and street-corner gangs to actively try and cash in on criminal business 
(Sesser, 2004). Occasionally, these competitors could pose a serious threat to the 
enterprise of piracy, organised through a symbiotic relationship between the syndicate 
leader and corrupt regulators. Such threats necessitate lower ranking police sergeants 
and constables to exercise police discretion in order to eliminate these other competitors 
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at the micro level. Events that led the syndicate leader to negotiate the franchise of 
syndicate-produced pirated DVDs to the Omega gangs constitute a case in point that will 
be recapitulated here. In 1996, leaders of the Omega gang developed a strategy aimed 
at exploiting syndicate-produced pirated DVDs for the gang‟s economic advancement. 
Failing to secure the alliance of directors of the MFCB and the police, Omega leaders 
invested in IT equipment to produce duplicate copies of syndicate-produced pirated 
DVDs in bulk to be sold to consumers at a just a ringgit higher than the price quoted by 
the syndicate. Omega leaders began selling duplicate copies of syndicate-produced 
pirated DVDs in various parts of Johor Bahru, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Members of 
the syndicate investigating the drop in their sales followed the alerts of their regular 
customers regarding new peddlers whose pirated DVDs parallel the quality of syndicate-
produced DVD and priced only a dollar more, in Kampung Baru and Bukit Bintang in KL 
and Danga Bay in Johor Bahru. The mode of conflict resolution adopted by the syndicate 
leader against Omega leaders reflects the impetus to avoid the likelihood of betraying 
the „invisibility‟ of the syndicates and jeopardising an economically-lucrative cooperation 
established between the syndicate leader and corrupt regulators to be forefront. To 
avert violent confrontations with Omega leaders that will inevitably induce a legal inquiry 
concerning the cause of the outbreak of violence and expose the organisation of the 
piracy enterprise, the syndicate leader strategically invoked the assistance of police 
inspectors. Police inspectors subsequently commissioned police sergeants and 
constables on the ground to exercise discretion in performing daily raids at 
establishments run by Omega members, arresting the peddlers, confiscating the pirated 
DVDs and running Omega‟s businesses into the ground. Police discretion exercised over 
establishments peddling pirated DVDs that are specifically operated by Omega members 
effectually forced Omega leaders to enter into negotiations with the syndicate leader to 
franchise syndicate-produced pirated DVDs. The piracy enterprise operated by the 
syndicate leader is protected from exploitation from other criminal groups and legal 
strategies as a direct consequence of police cooperation with the syndicate leader in the 
piracy enterprise.  
c. Indeterminate consumer deterrence  
Finally, the cooperation among syndicate leaders, the Malaysian police and 
custom officers manning the borders between Malaysian and Singapore, Thailand and 
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Indonesia in the enterprise of piracy indirectly means a lack of any systematically 
enforceable legal deterrence for consumers. Often penalties against consumers by social 
control agents are slaps on the wrist in the form of probationary warnings either with or 
without confiscating the pirated DVDs or confiscation of the DVDs without filing formal 
charges (see Bloch et al., 1993). Data gathered from the syndicate leader and the 
Omega gang suggest that Malaysian and Singaporean consumers, at a relatively equal 
degree across divisions of ethnic groups, class, age and gender, endorse the enterprise 
of piracy. 
Driven by the intricate cooperation among syndicate leaders, police officers, 
directors of the MFCB, and custom officers who man the border between Malaysia and 
Singapore, the enterprise of piracy exposes the ambiguity between „conformists‟ and 
„innovators‟, „insiders‟ and „outsiders‟ (Merton, 1938, 1972) within the criminal 
enterprise. As reflected by the enterprise of piracy, Merton‟s categories of „conformist‟ 
and „innovator‟ are in fact not mutually exclusive, since corrupt regulators who are key 
players within the piracy enterprise combine both legitimate and illegitimate means of 
opportunity in order to achieve their tangible and intangible aspirations.  
d. Regulation as market maximisation 
Corrupt regulators who lend their legitimately-acquired power and authority to 
facilitate the flow of illicit goods and services, and rendering porous the boundaries, 
between the legitimate and illegitimate spheres of society, in an attempt to advance 
their individual tangible and intangible interests, have been conceptualised as 
„maximizers‟ (Murphy and Robinson, 2008). Through a narrative analysis of testimonies 
provided by individuals convicted for their roles in corporate crimes, Murphy and 
Robinson develop the concept of the „maximizer‟. Murphy and Robinson (2008: 10) 
assert that the aspiration for economic achievement contains within it situations that 
encourage and even sometimes mandate violating the criminal law as a component or 
codicil of legitimate activity in order to achieve the consecrated value of money, to 
overcome goals–means discrepancies. The negotiated cooperation between the 
syndicate leader and corrupt regulators is incited by a mutually beneficial relationship, 
marked by the ability of each social actor to meet the demands of the other. Corrupt 
regulators are essentially maximisers who utilise legitimate or institutionalised means as 
well as illegitimate or non-institutionalised means in pursuit of culture goals. Thus, 
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maximization involves a combination of conformity and innovation. „Maximizers‟ 
conceptually refer to individuals who simultaneously use and incorporate legitimate and 
illegitimate means of opportunity in the pursuit of profit and/or monetary gain (Murphy 
and Robinson, 2008: 502). Enriching Merton‟s category of individual adaptation to strain, 
this new mode of adaptation, „maximization‟ encompasses groups, occupational roles, 
and subcultures who simultaneously and regularly accept the norms of conformity and 
innovation, law-abiding and law-breaking behaviours. Corrupt regulators or „maximisers‟ 
are fundamental to the criminal business whose respective motivations, rationalisations 
of positive and negative implications and dynamic negotiations underlying their 
cooperative relationship can be interpreted through an enterprise framework. 
An underlying aspiration and consequence of the enterprise/regulatory cross over 
is the establishment and maintenance of market ordering. In conventional organised 
crime analysis disorder features as a crucial discriminator of illegitimate business.  The 
reverse is the experience of syndicate senior management in our case study and argues 
against the order/disorder dichotomy in crime business. 
 
Ordering the illegitimate sector of society 
Thus far, the discussion of piracy deals with criminal enterprise from a micro 
perspective. Description of the empirical organisation of piracy in the first section and 
the subsequent discussion of the crucial function of corrupt regulators to criminal 
enterprise focuses on the rationalisations of key social actors participating in the 
enterprise of piracy. This section, shifts to examine how these micro rationalisations, 
which engender permeability between the boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate 
spheres of society, affect the organisational structure of individual criminal organisations 
and indirectly the macro socio-economic structure of the illegitimate sector of society.  
A comparison of data gathered from the syndicate leader and Omega leaders on 
the organisation of piracy and the management of inter-group conflict reveals acute 
differences in organisational structure between the syndicate and the Omega gang as an 
indirect consequence of their respective success and failure to negotiate the alliance of 
corrupt regulators or maximisers. The distinctive structural features that set the 
syndicate apart from the Omega gang include:  
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 a greater degree of bureaucratisation exhibited in the syndicate‟s organisational 
structure;  
 systematic rationalisation of all actions by syndicate members in terms of 
tangibles and intangible benefits including, whether the actions promote and 
enhance or hinder and impair the syndicate‟s relationship with maximisers, 
whether the actions are economically rational or irrational and positive and 
negative implications for the entity‟s reputation, status, power;  
 having access to lucrative criminal enterprises, whose execution are contingent 
on the cooperation of maximisers; and  
 exhibiting a lesser predisposition to violence and disorderly behaviour.  
These differences in organisational structure between the syndicate and the 
Omega gang, determined by respective success and failure to secure the alliance of 
maximisers, indirectly inclines the syndicate towards running economically lucrative 
enterprises compared to the Omega gang. Having secured and more importantly 
seeking to maintain the alliance of maximisers determines the structural organisation of 
the syndicate in such a way that renders the former to be more economically productive 
compared to the Omega gang.  
The previous section shows that by securing the cooperation of opportunistic 
„maximisers‟ the syndicate leader is able to operate an uninterrupted enterprise of 
piracy. In contrast, the failure to secure the cooperation of corrupt regulators exposes 
the Omega gang to the regulatory sanctions of social control agents, which interrupt 
their stable, effective involvement in the criminal enterprise of piracy. In order to secure 
a stable participation in the enterprise of piracy, the Omega gang is forced to declare 
their subordination and negotiate cooperation with the economically stable syndicate. 
More importantly therefore, differences in the economic viability between the syndicate 
and Omega forces the latter to be asymmetrically dependent on former, which affects 
the macro, socio-economic structure of the illegitimate sector of society. 
Armed with the alliance of corrupt regulators, the syndicate leader strategically 
averts the gaze of social control agents to ensure the stable and orderly functioning of 
the piracy enterprise. Consequently, the syndicate is economically viable. In this sense 
the syndicate that secures the dynamic alliance of maximizers systematically exhibit a 
set of structural features that are akin to Cloward and Ohlin‟s (1960) concept of „criminal 
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gang‟. These structural features are aimed at protecting the alliance of maximizers. An 
in-depth analysis of enterprise dynamics reveals an intense degree of rationality 
pervading the organisational structure of the criminal syndicate. Akin to a bureaucracy, 
the organisational structure of the syndicate manifests a high degree of specialisation of 
functions, rigid adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority. The 
bureaucratisation of the organised criminal syndicate ensures that systematic 
investigation and reason precede all of the group‟s decision-making processes instead of 
the irrational temperaments of members who occupy the lower rung positions of the 
syndicate or characterises the Omega gang (Hanif, 2008b). Bureaucratising the 
syndicate‟s criminal operations ensures that violence is kept to a minimum in order to 
elude the interest of the public that would elicit the attention of social control agents.  
A pertinent example is the mode of conflict resolution adopted by a group of 
syndicate leaders to resolve price competition within the illegitimate market. In the state 
of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the sale and distribution of illegal DVDs detailed earlier is 
monopolised by five syndicates. Leaders and members of these five syndicates operate 
respectively in north, south, east, west and central Kuala Lumpur. Despite the attempt 
to reduce competition through geographical segregation, the economic recession in 
2007 caused the sale price of pirated DVDs to fluctuate as each syndicate competed 
with the price of others to maintain, if not promote, their sales of pirated DVDs. The 
resolution of this conflict of interests among the five syndicate leaders assumed the form 
of a highly restrained response, specifically negotiations rather than violent 
confrontations, to refrain from jeopardising the framework of criminal enterprise of 
piracy. Across the board, there was an impetus to reach an amicable settlement to avert 
violent confrontations.  In this resolution certain features of criminal enterprise ordering 
were apparent: 
1. Compliance through self regulation 
Violent confrontations would inevitably expose and subsequently disrupt the 
lucrative enterprise of piracy and the symbiotic relationship between corrupt regulators 
to the public and incorrupt social control agents. Inevitably, a „gang-war‟ among 
members of the syndicates will induce a legal inquiry with regards to the cause of the 
outbreak of violence. This investigation would have undoubtedly implicated the 
paramount role of the directors of the MFCB, police, custom officers, in the criminal 
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enterprise and adversely affect the future cooperation of corrupt regulators with 
syndicate leaders. More importantly, by implicating the role of corrupt regulators in the 
piracy enterprise and jeopardising their socio-economic statuses, other criminal 
enterprises operated by these criminal syndicates, which is heavily reliant on the 
cooperation of these maximisers would be negatively affected as well. The future 
inability of the syndicate leaders to secure the cooperation of corrupt regulators, as a 
result of choosing violent war as a mode of conflict resolution could translate into a 
series of economically-unprofitable outcomes. Prompted by an economically-sound 
rationale, the syndicate leaders standardised the price of DVDs across Kuala Lumpur to 
seven ringgit each and enforced a strict order to lower-ranking members of the 
syndicates to remain within their established territory.  
2. Bureaucratic anonymity 
A high degree of secrecy that each member of the syndicate is expected to 
observe through the bureaucratisation of the syndicate‟s organisational structure is 
subsumed under this rationality. Secrecy includes denying membership or knowledge of 
the syndicate, incurring negative consequences for acknowledging one's membership, 
abiding by the group‟s code of ethics and maintaining strong ties between members of 
the organisation. Maintaining a high degree of secrecy is economically rational from the 
perspective of the syndicate, because secrecy averts knowledge of the extent of the 
syndicate‟s criminal endeavours from becoming apparent to the public and gaining 
attention of the mass media that could potentially translate into a moral panic. Moral 
panic surrounding the syndicate will inevitably induce official investigations that would 
obstruct the operation of a profitable, ordered and functionally integrated criminal 
enterprise. Second, a high degree of secrecy also facilitates the ability of the organised 
criminal syndicate to secure a symbiotic relationship with corrupt regulators in order to 
facilitate the syndicate‟s illegitimate enterprises without posing a threat to the latter‟s 
status and credibility. 
In contrast, the Omega gang that fails to secure the cooperation of maximizers is 
subject to the „gaze‟ or discretionary policing of social control agents which interrupts 
their stable, effective involvement in criminal enterprises. Discretionary policing assumes 
the form of stop and search practices, detention without trial, detention in police 
stations, „questionings‟, „status degradation ceremonies‟, extracting deference and 
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inflicting summary punishment. A consequence of this form of policing is that the 
Omega gang consequently occupies a marginal status in the illegitimate society and 
exhibit characteristics akin to a „retreatist‟ gang (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).  
3. Differential reliance on racial bonding dependent on social positioning 
Retreatist gangs, like Omgea, do not possess the skills to be considered criminal 
gangs and members do not participate in stable forms of criminal enterprise, retreating 
into a role on the fringe of illegitimate sector of society (see Hanif, 2008a, 2008b). 
Omega‟s failure to provide its members with any pecuniary advantages necessitates the 
gang‟s exploitation of „operative criteria‟ to advance its interests. Operative criteria refer 
to an individual‟s ascribed status, specifically the affinity to „race‟ and „religion‟ as 
ideological tools to secure membership for the group. A contradiction between the 
ideology of the Omega gang to promote the interests of „Malay Muslims‟ and the lived 
experiences of members of the Omega gang, mostly dying in inter-gang wars, living in 
poverty or enduring imprisonment, have frequently threatened Omega‟s cohesiveness. 
Omega‟s leaders find it an arduous task to reconcile the irrational and untenable 
ideologies tools of „race‟ and „religion‟, increasingly deconstructed by Omega members, 
to sustain and expand their membership without delivering tangible benefits to members 
of the group (Hanif, 2008b). Contrarily the syndicate leader stresses „formal criteria‟, 
conceptually referring to achieved status or the measure of an individual‟s ability, as the 
basis for every member to move up the ranks within the syndicate. The syndicate leader 
additionally asserts that a system of economic rewards based on „formal criteria‟ which 
appeals to individuals regardless of „race‟ or „religion‟, effectively expanding the 
syndicate‟s membership and attracting individuals with skills and expertise into the 
syndicate, promotes a positive work ethic among members and is overall an 
economically sensible decision. 
  Through a comparative analysis, it can be established that their social positioning 
relative to their alliance with maximizers empirically influences the micro structural 
features of the syndicate and the Omega gang. Of greater significance is that the 
structural organisation of criminal organisations can either advance their criminal 
pursuits and solidify their socio-economic position or obstruct their socio-economic 
advancement in the context of illegitimate sector of society. The ordered and 
hierarchical socio-economic order of illegitimate sector of society is characterised by an 
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asymmetrical dependence of criminal entities, unable to secure the alliance of corrupt 
regulators, on criminal organisations whose alliance with maximizers renders upon them 
a structure that is suited to running an enterprise. In order to secure some form of 
economic benefit from ongoing criminal enterprises within the illegitimate sector of 
society, criminal entities that fail to secure the cooperation of maximizers negotiate a 
subordinate cooperation with criminal organisations that are part of a dynamic criminal 
enterprise facilitated by maximisers. This interdependence is the basis for theorising the 
ordered and hierarchical structure of the illegitimate sector of society.  
The re-conceptualisation of enterprise theory invites a re-imagination of the 
theory method nexus in researching Asian organised crime. At this point we move away 
from describing the dynamics of crime business within a market/enterprise frame.  The 
remainder of the paper sets out how these insights can transmigrate researching 
organised crime at large.  The insider/outsider dichotomy, responsible as it is for 
retarding enterprise theory, offers a way out of its own limitations. 
 
Researching criminal enterprise using the ‘Two Napkins’ 
methodology- Bringing the outsiders and insiders13 
To understand the case study of broadcast media piracy within a market model 
and against a dynamic enterprise frame demands a methodological framework designed 
to address the intricate synergies between the organisation of criminal enterprise and 
the intra-organisation of individual criminal groups. Further, there is a need to deal 
critically and dynamically with the impact of these synergies on the data-gathering 
process. Enterprise theory then requires a fresh methodology of comparative 
engagement with the criminal business society within and without critical enterprise 
„moments‟.  This section identifies the interactive challenges of researching criminal 
                                                          
13
 Fundamentally, this paper was developed by and targets qualitative researchers who pursue a 
methodological framework through which the actions of micro entities feasibly translate into a macro 
theorisation about networks and patterns of behaviour that ensures the stability of a society, whether 
illegitimate or otherwise. The process of developing such a methodological framework has induced a 
rethinking of ‘insiders’ as the source of valid, objective and credible primary data, a re-conceptualisation 
of ‘outsiders’ and the significance of that re-conceptualisation for capturing the dynamics that facilitate a 
criminal enterprise. 
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enterprise, and proposes the methodological framework of „two napkins‟ as a multi-
levelled comparative technology.  
Discussions regarding the validity and credibility of qualitative data of a particular 
phenomenon under investigation normatively sink into a critique of the status of the 
source of knowledge either as „insiders‟ to be juxtaposed against „outsiders‟. This 
“insider-outsider” debate was stimulated by Merton's (1972) paper on the sociology of 
knowledge, a response to the popular view among some black scholars in the late sixties 
and early seventies that white scholars be excluded from research in black communities. 
Merton identifies two extreme positions represented in what he sees as an elitist and 
exclusionary position. One holds that insiders have monopolistic access to knowledge of 
a group: the insider is “endowed with special insight into matters necessarily obscure to 
others, thus possessed of a penetrating discernment” (1972: 11). The other, the 
outsider doctrine, holds that unprejudiced knowledge about groups is accessible only to 
non-members of those groups.  
The dichotomy between „insiders‟ and outsiders‟, and the competing validity and 
credibility of the body of knowledge possessed by members of each category, obscure 
the essential interactive context of researching media piracy.  We have shown, and this 
dichotomy avoids, how contingent the interactive enterprise of profitable crime business 
will be on the collaboration between social actors who crossover the legitimate and 
illegitimate sectors of society. This empirical revelation confronts the assumption that 
knowledge of criminal enterprise is embedded in „insiders‟ functioning within the 
illegitimate sector of society, presumed to be rigidly cordoned from the legitimate sector 
of society and dichotomised against „outsiders‟ who are supposedly restricted to the 
legitimate sector.  
There is not time here to engage a Focaudian analysis of the power dynamics of 
knowledge manufacture, fruitful as this direction would be for another purpose. Suffice 
the observation here that focussing understandings of organised crime on low level 
„insiders‟ had not only distorted the reality of crime business but has accommodated 
prevailing law and order discourse in the field.  Portraying from this perspective, criminal 
enterprise as divorced from and destructive of legitimate commerce, but for law 
enforcement regulation presents obvious advantages for crime control governance.  
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Power invests in the insider/outsider knowledge frame.  Power also recurs to the 
outsider seeking legitimacy in distance and distinction from the insider world. 
Enforcing, or even recognising, model and misleading dichotomies between 
„insiders‟ and „outsiders‟ as well as „legitimate‟ as opposed to „illegitimate‟ spheres of 
society, is at best ideological. This normative discrimination of markets and market 
players effectively constrains the potential to appreciate the complementary and 
indispensable collaboration of outsiders with insiders in selectively facilitating criminal 
enterprise by corrupt regulators, detailed above.  
Analysing insider/outsider interaction, far from confirming the analytical integrity 
of the dichotomy, invites consideration of enterprise dynamics, which collapse rather 
than confirm the legitimacy divide: 
a. Skewed view from below 
The example of selective policing regulation dependent on social positioning 
within the criminal enterprise highlights another problem that renders the normative 
„insider‟ versus „outsider‟ debate distracting in the context of researching criminal 
enterprise. Knowledge pertaining to the organisation of the media piracy trade is not 
uniformly distributed throughout the ranks of any particular criminal entity. It is equally 
possible that maximisers who are not members of any criminal entities may possess a 
better understanding or a bird‟s eye view of criminal enterprise compared to rank and 
file members of the syndicate or Omega.  
The obscurity of criminal networks typically induces researcher to formulate their 
understanding of organised crime by inferring and extrapolating the data gathered from 
an exclusive population sample, typically accessible „insiders‟ like members occupying 
the lower rungs of criminal groups or leaders of petty gangs. Lesser status gang 
operatives, because of their visible „insider‟ positioning within the illegitimate sector of 
society, are assumed by the naïve researcher to possess monopolistic access to 
knowledge about the organised criminal enterprise being studied. This neglects two 
empirical realities. First, the position an insider occupies along the hierarchical structure 
of a criminal organisation and the body of knowledge that the consequently insider 
possesses is characterised by a direct and often dependent relationships.14 Accessible 
                                                          
14
 This was apparent from qualitative fieldwork with Omega members. 
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„insiders‟ like members occupying the lower rungs of criminal groups are typically 
subjects of false consciousness, whose solidarity to the group is a consequence of 
obligatory ideologies perpetrated by gang leaders and who are ignorant of the extent 
and dynamics of criminal enterprise beyond their limited involvement.  
Additional to the limited understandings of an enterprise perspective which they 
offer, data gathered from low-ranking members of criminal organisations, who are 
predisposed to petty conflicts as a demonstration of masculine bravado, direct 
confrontations with social control agents and inter-gang conflict at an everyday level, 
tend to emphasise disorder and dysfunction. Contrarily, data gathered from the 
syndicate leader reveals dynamic negotiations to be the primary mode of conflict 
resolution among key players within the enterprise of piracy to protect the stability of 
criminal business. Partial understanding of organised crime is a direct consequence of 
limitations in the methodological framework of a particular study. „Insiders‟ categorically 
embody a heterogeneous group of individuals whose lived realities within the illegitimate 
sector of society, and subsequently knowledge of organised crime, vary intensely. 
This potential to create stylised and alien market perspectives of criminal 
enterprise depending on overly accessible lesser stakeholders in the business network, 
co-incidently confirms the insider/outside, legitimate/illegitimate divide.  Access to 
different levels and hierarchies of authority and decision-making in the enterprise 
organisation challenges both the stylisation and the dichotomy it fosters.  Recognition of 
the potential to skew variant indication of criminal enterprise towards the illegitimate, 
disorderly and confrontational is a strong argument to develop a multi-variant and 
comparative research methodology with capacity to interrogate crucial sites of internal 
organisational enterprise.  Such a comparative research frame also requires viewing 
from outside the enterprise to the extent that non-member maximisers make the switch 
without/within to facilitate profitability and market share.  This is no different to 
business analysis methods in the non-crime context. 
b. Illusive objectivity 
The dichotomy between insiders and outsiders advocated by qualitative social 
scientists to obtain a verstehen and objective understanding of a particular phenomena, 
in effect possesses the potential to compromise the researcher‟s accurate appreciation 
of the research inquiry. This dichotomy fundamentally:  
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(1) obstructed the researcher‟s ability to triangulate primary data provided by Omega 
members in order to differentiate ideological responses from truthful information,  
(2) hindered the researcher from appreciating the emergence of the Omega secret 
society as an ethnic enterprise and its organisational features as a micro phenomenon, 
relational to the macro socio-economic context of Singapore‟s illegitimate sector of 
enterprise15,  
(3) impeded any potential for the researcher to forward either a holistic understanding 
or a macro theorisation of criminal enterprise and criminal entities and  
(4) restricted the researcher to eclectic theorisations instead of facilitating intellectual 
harmony or synthesis between discrete elements that thematically relate to criminal 
entities and criminal enterprise. 
c. Need for dynamic integration 
The two napkins methodology16 moves beyond observer bias and first engages 
with the transaction of meaning and perception, which marks out interactive 
methodology, and enterprise theorising.  In this respect, we invite the application of a 
dynamic rather than a regressive and research-centric methodology, to complement and 
develop a transactional theorising about gangs, syndicates and their crossover into 
regulatory spheres. Researching enterprise means researching people, connections, 
dynamics and transitions within communities of meaning; identified communities where 
enterprise is achieved and transacted.  Our case studies reveal that in the most 
apparent sense these communities straddle soft divisions of illegitimate criminal 
business, and legitimate market regulation.  In this respect an important dichotomy of 
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 Omega is an ethnic enterprise incited by the socio-economic marginalisation of Malay members vis-à-
vis Chinese members in Chinese secret societies. Within Chinese secret societies, goals of economic 
success are ideologically emphasised as a legitimate expectation for all its members. Achieved statuses 
are commonly emphasised among all members of Chinese secret societies as the individuals strive to rise 
within illegitimate society. Despite their ‘efforts, allegiance to rules and regulations, and their willingness 
to risk limbs and life,’ however, Malay members of Chinese secret societies find themselves restricted to 
rank and file positions and deprived of access to illegitimate economic opportunities and learning 
structures. Malay members of Chinese secret societies perceive their ethnic identity and the implicit 
racism practiced by Chinese leaders in Chinese secret societies, as the barrier against the upward mobility 
of Malays within Singapore’s illegitimate sector. Omega emerged as a form of retaliation to the 
marginalisation of Malays within Chinese secret societies dominating Singapore’s illegitimate context 
(Hanif, 2008b: 73-74).  
 
16
 The graphic of this theory is comparison of folds (and their fields) within a wider boundary.  Against this 
is overlaid another such field until a rich multi-variant, multi-dimensional framework is constructed. 
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business for law enforcement can be challenged and along with it the uni-directional 
consideration of insider/outsider status of business players and market regulators. We 
challenge this by looking at: 
 how players in the gang and the syndicate, and beyond in the realm of 
„legitimate regulation view each other as outsiders, and see themselves inside 
the essential sphere of  their perception; 
 how players move inside and outside identified spheres of perception and 
communities of enterprise; 
 how significant intermediaries can be identified as holding specialist knowledge 
and unique truth for the research enterprise when in fact they may create and 
construct perceptions for identifiable interests; and 
 how the observer can be located inside and outside certain communities of 
enterprise for the purpose of engaging contested perceptions without debasing 
the interactive understanding being pursued. 
d. Multi-variant, multi-dimensional interaction and validation 
Here the methodology of „two napkins‟17 prescribed in this paper proves to be 
advantageous in triangulating qualitative data within a context where enterprise 
constitutes the research focus. Why a „napkin‟ imagery? A napkin is typically a large 
rectangular cloth that is folded lengthwise or breadth-wise into a series of smaller 
rectangular flaps. Although the rectangular flaps can be sequentially unfolded to unravel 
a whole rectangle, the pressed boundaries that distinguish one flap from another will 
remain imprinted in the cloth. Emphasising the difference between the rectangular cloth 
from which a series of rectangular flaps (fields) are shaped to make the eventual napkin 
is an important distinction because cloth and flaps serve as separate analogies in the 
methodological framework aimed at researching criminal enterprise. Each entire 
rectangular cloth represents a particular community (say, enterprise; regulators), 
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 The folds (square fields) of the napkin represent single variants such as race or masculinity which if used 
for static and one-dimensional variant analysis are prone to confirm some of the mythologies which 
characterise the structures ad motivations for Asian organised crime.  Rather, if these fields are 
interrogated for their dynamic contribution to structure and function, and from there the comparison is 
multi-variant and interactive, the analysis holds a potential for enterprise understanding at all crucial 
levels of the hierarchy.  Above this other napkins with their interactive fields can inform the enterprise 
analysis representing as they may the world of non-gang, non-syndicate regulation. 
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legitimate or illegitimate, and its entire hierarchy, which in the case study of media 
piracy includes the crime syndicate, the Omega gang, and the group of corrupt police, 
custom officers and directors of the MFCB. Each flap within the rectangular cloth is to be 
understood as various perspectives, enterprise, race, gender, religion, class or biology, 
through which a researcher may interpret and analyse the actions of social actors within 
a particular group that constitutes the research focus.18 The various flaps within a single 
napkin are sensitive to the notion that different perspectives may be most applicable in 
making sense of the discourses and the lived realities of members occupying various 
ranks within a particular group, which directly emphasise a comparative dimension 
within the context of a single napkin or a single group. 
One approach which we favour towards the empowering and enlivening of 
enterprise theory as an explanatory paradigm for crime business is to inject a dynamic, 
interactive and multi-dimensional commitment to the comparative research endeavour. 
As we have said earlier, our work envisages criminal enterprise as an interactive, 
integrated and dynamic field of commercial relationships and arrangements. This field 
flows across a range of regulatory situations and „boundaries of permission‟. The 
resultant crime opportunities in a business sense are, as a consequence‟, as adaptable 
to the conditions of market profit as may be any legitimate commercial endeavour. They 
need to be researched as such. At the risk of simply hinting at the dimensions of a 
comparative aspirations for enterprise theory they are these: 
 Within the gang – to break free of single or limited variant analysis of the 
construction, organisation, legitimacy and authority of the essential 
organisational unit; 
 Gang to syndicate – how are power/authority and relationships of dependency 
constructed up and down the syndicate chain; how does this lead to essential 
service delivery and facilitation? 
 Syndicate to legitimate regulators and vice versa – how are regulatory market 
frames negotiated and utilised for individual and collective benefit? 
                                                          
18
 The use of napkins as an analogy is purely incidental since I happened to be engaged in a conversation 
with Professor Mark Findlay at the recently demolished BB’s Café in the University of Sydney, when this 
methodological framework was born. 
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 Across conditions of enterprise – to compare the commercial interests and 
arrangements that eventuate in a profitable crime business and its 
proliferation/perpetuation; 
 Across complementary business enterprises – in trade relations enterprises 
collaborate and complete.  Where do illegitimate arrangements form the linkages 
for these relations? 
 In and out of the research frame – Insiders? Outsiders? – on to a new 
methodological consideration of the research mission. 
With reference to piracy, this paper will show that the validity and accuracy of 
the data gathered from the syndicate leader on the organisation of piracy can only be 
effectively triangulated by corrupt regulators like members of the police and directors of 
the MFCB, who are typically thought of as „outsiders‟ to the criminal enterprise. Based on 
our experience, the inclusion of „outsiders‟, in this case-study referring to people who 
interact with the particular group or community being researched upon but who do not 
necessarily originate from that community or group instead of researchers, is a revealing 
strategy. Researching criminal enterprise requires a methodological framework that 
includes at least two napkins or two communities of stakeholders at different levels of 
dependency or authority. Distinguishing between illegitimate and legitimate market 
representation is not the reason for or the reality of the two napkins.  An interrogation 
of the way that the flaps inter-relate, and then how the different communities overly 
denies a dichotomy based on simple regulatory or normative identity and distinction.   
e. Interactive reality of research object 
The interaction between innovators (typically thought of as „insiders‟) and 
maximisers (typically thought of as „outsiders‟) is enriching and enlivening when 
enterprise is the research object. Established research dichotomies fall away via an 
interactive methodology including the dynamic understandings of outsiders as an active 
influence on the progressional perspectives of insiders. Interaction as advanced here 
espouses a more extroverted methodology which recognises the influence and 
importance of „outsiders‟ as they relate and react to the observed insider community. 
The triangulation of primary data provided by insiders through the perspective of 
outsiders in action within and across frames of observation, gives a capacity to critically 
evaluate the process of perception and meaning construction.  Insider understandings 
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and perceptions are as fluid as might be their status and positioning in the enterprise. 
Recognising the influence of outsider intervention and representation, over meaning 
creation, the interaction in enterprise is as much the research object as might be 
observing key players and their positioning relative to the researcher.  
In our researching criminal gangs, „outsiders‟ include police officers who are 
bribed by gang members, politicians who interact with or engage the services of gang 
members, and the inter-relationship between criminal groups within a particular context 
and across national boundaries. The inclusion of these „outsiders‟ facilitates a macro 
theorisation rather than a simple description which is usually generated when interviews 
are done solely with insiders.  
Police corruption, political corruption and the simultaneous utilization of 
legitimate or institutionalized means and illegitimate means by „maximisers‟ to facilitate 
their economic enterprises empirically attest to the indistinct personalities of „insiders‟ as 
opposed to „outsiders‟ and the vague demarcation between legitimate and illegitimate 
contexts. Proposing the inclusion of outsiders is methodologically rational since it allows 
the researcher to appreciate dynamics of cooperation among various groups between 
the fluid boundaries of „legitimate‟ and illegitimate‟ society, functions as a mode of 
triangulating primary data provided by insiders, and serves as a platform for macro and 
holistic theorisations.  
 
Re-positioning enterprise theory – Crime business as usual  
Legal to illegal businesses requires examination in light of the market structure 
and the organisational structure in which and by which they operate. The array of 
important relationships, which result from the necessary interplay between market 
structure and organisational structure, must be understood. Otherwise the 
representation of criminal enterprise will forever be stylised by distracted dichotomies 
(legitimate business vs. the syndicate), moralising psychologising (legitimate 
businessmen being corrupted by mobsters), and a tacit belief in an alien spectre 
seducing away the virginal purity of the illusive free market (infiltration of legitimate 
business) (Martin, 1981: 57).  
Good business is steady business.  Strain, conflict and disorder are not generally 
conducive to the stable and reproductive market conditions necessary for the grounding 
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and development of profitable enterprise.  Where crime business relies on violence and 
intimidation for its market framework more than market positioning, the parallels with 
business enterprise theory as it emerges from conventional organisational theory are at 
their most unconvincing.  Broadcast piracy on the other-hand represents a profitable, 
predictable and perennial commercial opportunity where the variables of economic 
analysis merge comfortably with theorising property crime relationships. The challenge 
for enterprise theory is to break free of the normative and moralist dichotomies (false as 
they are) between good and bad business, legitimate and illegitimate commerce.  Once 
outside the construction of organised crime as disorderly and thereby antithetical to a 
better business model, enterprise theory can reveal the motivations behind corrupt 
regulatory relationships and anti-competitive marketing, which characterise crime 
business much more than violence and intimidation. In this, enterprise theory does not 
provide an apologia for criminal corruption of legitimate markets.  Rather it enables a 
consideration of the corruptability of regulators and the susceptibility of inelastic market 
models to criminal competition. 
In many of its ramifications enterprise theory sets out to usefully deconstruct 
organised crime but fails to meet its potential. This is particularly so where racialist 
stereotyping constructs the engagement between criminology theorising and more 
conventional market analysis.  Violence, racial division, ethnic rivalry, organisational 
secrecy, mystical loyalty, and more violence, for instance, typify Asian crime business. 
For law enforcement discourse, this enables an „us-and-them‟ narrative where legitimate 
commerce is the unwilling victim of criminal infiltration, long-suffering regulators are 
out-numbered and out-muscled by a foreign threat, and good business is raped by a 
trade that has no moral limits. 
An essential reason for the teleological failure of enterprise theory is it‟s 
incapacity to dispassionately recognise and engage with crime as „good‟ business in a 
profit/market sense, and the commercially conducive conditions of criminality 
(particularly corruption) as they advance profit.  In many transitional societies, in fact, 
crime and corruption are not only good business they may be the only viable business 
(Findlay, 2007).   
Enterprise theory has little to say about more viable trading arrangements, 
where black markets are the market of choice for the consumer. This is because the 
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more generalised and a-historical musings within enterprise theory about the 
progression of market relations and commercial arrangements tend to take as a given 
that consumer preference for crime business is dependent on crime factors (addiction, 
perversions, violence, intimidation) rather than more predictable consumer influences 
such as price and quality. 
The factors that explain the receptiveness of Malaysians and Singaporeans to 
pirated DVDs can reveal themselves clearly through the analytical framework of 
enterprise theory, so long as common analytical frames are employed as those that 
would to legitimate business. Contrary to the claim of legitimate institutions that the 
price and quality of pirated DVDs is characterised by a direct relationship, where a low 
price guarantees a low quality product, syndicate-produced pirated DVDs increasingly 
expose the fallacy of such a claim to consumers. Duplicated directly from original copies 
of films obtained from directors of the MFCB, syndicate-produced pirated DVDs convince 
consumers that low prices and high quality products are not mutually exclusive. For the 
same product, criminal business offer consumers a better value for their money 
compared to legitimate institutions. For the bulk of consumers, the entertainment value 
of any latest Hollywood, Bollywood or Chinese films either diminishes or disappears once 
they have watched and become familiar with the characters and plots of the movie. This 
is because for most consumers, „cultural products like movies may be defined tentatively 
as “nonmaterial” goods directed at a public of consumers, for whom they generally 
serve an aesthetic or expressive, rather than a clearly utilitarian function‟ (Hirsch 1972: 
641-642). Exacerbated by the rapid turnover of one acclaimed blockbuster after another 
from the Hollywood, Bollywood and Chinese industries, economically sensible consumers 
respond to the constant pull towards consumption by purchasing the excellent quality 
yet cheap pirated DVDs. The short life span of any particular film to entertain consumers 
is demonstrable from the numerous appeals and negotiations of consumers to members 
of the syndicate that operate at the ground level to exchange their undamaged pirated 
DVDs for new titles at a slightly cheaper price, which would otherwise be shared, sold, 
chucked or given away.  
As the case study suggests, many of the „services‟ and facilitations offered by the 
crime syndicate are crucial to the achievement of a more profitable commercial trade 
than the legitimate market (with its framework of regulation) can offer. Profit declares 
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this. Market sustainability evidences this.  Consumer loyalty makes the business stable 
and makes it pay. 
As is argued above, underpinning constraint on the analytical utility of enterprise 
theory is the moral commitment to free market enterprise as a „good‟. From this 
position, any theorising of criminal enterprise is constrained to recognise „good and bad 
business‟ dichotomies.  The legitimate market, no matter how fragile or corrupt, has to 
be celebrated above even more profitable illegitimate market conditions. The illegitimate 
market is to be policed rather than regulated. 
What flows from this is the incapacity, therefore, of some enterprise theory 
applications to account for the symbiotic relationship, which the case-study reveals 
between regulators and criminal commercial entities to reconstruct the market to their 
mutual advantage.  If enterprise theory separates the regulatory frames of the 
legitimate and illegitimate markets in an effort to endorse the priority of good business 
(and the criminality of illegitimate commerce) it fails to explore the rich mine of 
causation that is „cross-over‟. Findlay suggests, referring to understanding the business 
utility of corruption that: 
 
By focusing on corruption and control, while ignoring the structures of 
permission within which they connect, an accurate appreciation of their impact 
on other market relationships becomes difficult (Findlay, 1994: 280) 
 
Thus the over alliance of enterprise theory with the moral superiority of 
legitimate free-market economics, to the exclusion of understanding „freed-up‟ market 
forces through say broadcast piracy trading, dulls the capacity of enterprise theory to 
interrogate what challenges the illegitimate/legitimate market divide and makes crime 
business possible and profitable; regulatory cross-over. 
As with the case study compromised or corrupt „legitimate‟ market regulation can 
in fact favour crime business as much as it portends to manage authorised market 
relationships.  What enterprise theory can say about this depends on a neutralised 
approach to the market and its forces within a profit motivation (Findlay, 1994; 2007). 
Along with the moral modelling of good and bad business, and the crucial 
antipathies offered through organised crime mythologies, enterprise theory ends to treat 
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the progress of commercial ages without the benefit of historical engagement.  It is 
common to be offered by exponents of enterprise theory market „typologies‟ and 
business modes which may not even recognise let alone comparatively interrogate 
commercial arrangements enjoying crime capital, violent market construction, or corrupt 
protection from law enforcement.  The actuality of market conditions it where organised 
crime thrives.  Theories of organised crime cannot avoid or misappropriate these 
realities. 
Enterprise theory has fallen victim to the „triumph‟ of free market economics and 
notions of globalisation where materialism and modernity prevail (Findlay, 1994).  This is 
not surprising.  With the „collapse‟ of alternative and „competing‟ market paradigms (as 
much a political as an economic phenomenon) illegitimate market repositioning crucial in 
many transitional states has been dismissed as necessary if regrettable corrections on 
the road to western democracy. The relationship between political hegemony and 
economic development has added to the challenge of enterprise theorising organised 
crime. 
The case study presented above emphasise the need for theory building which is 
both interactive and capable of understanding dynamic and fluid commercial and 
regulatory relationships.  Enterprise theory further fails to address the realities of crime 
business if it is committed to institutions, structures and outcomes, without also 
interrogating the influences, which shape enterprise legitimate and illegitimate. 
Conversations with the crime boss after-all where about business, profit and 
sustainability Crime was the context and not the objective. 
 
Re-Imagining Asian crime- Back to the crime boss 
Instead of the crime boss who advocates disorder and celebrates violence, 
divulging reluctantly within a cramped, clandestine setting meant to restrict the flow of 
criminal confessions and formidable truths on organised crime that I expected, I 
confronted an antithetical reality. Exercising his „gaze‟ and leadership over a range of 
criminal enterprises spanning decades and extending beyond the Malaysian border is an 
applied economist whose description of criminal enterprises through the language of 
economics transported me to economics lectures in college. As a researcher who had 
seen the other-side of gang crime, I was rattled by relating to his business side. 
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Listening to his conversation I was overcome by p my inability to set claims to a trying 
field experience.19 Attempting to salvage my appreciation of the ‟dark side‟ of gang 
crime, I was offered a captivating and convincing case study on crime as business life, 
not crime as violent death. My parallax peaked when hyperactive visions of drug, human 
and organ trafficking was punctured by an extensive elaboration into the plain profit of 
piracy, specifically the organisation of the Malaysian market for the sale and distribution 
of pirated copies of latest Hollywood and Bollywood film releases on DVDs.  
Here were the real research dichotomies. Having accepted the practical and 
empirical challenges of studying crime as business, where does the crime fit in?  And 
what was it about criminal enterprise in the conversation laid out, that would merit a 
contextualisation as „Asian‟? With insider/outsider falling away was the inquiry returning 
to little more tan market differentiation or the colour of the collar? 
As the conversation progressed, my thoughts returned to the disposed; to the 
disengaged; to the unlucky; to the washed-up, the passed-over, the abused; to the 
dead.  Business and profit was only one dimension.  The conversation must be had with 
all those touched by the „crime business‟. 
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 A relative degree of coherence between the disconcerting situations in which I find myself during the 
course of my fieldwork and the agonising images that I anticipate facing has been the thread on which my 
conversational composure hangs in light of the grim faces of crime I have witnessed. These agonising 
images include the carcasses of foot-soldiers after a ‘gang war’, faceless flesh raped of any sense of being 
in down-trodden brothels, and under-aged boys scraping at the gang’s promises of racial and religious 
martyrdom while physically, intellectually and emotionally ravaged behind bars. The dark side of 
organised crime. Despite the absence of prosthetics for such perturbing sights, the scholarships of 
verstehen criminology, inclined towards ethnographies of criminal entities, criminal networks and cultures 
of imprisonment have mentally braced me to confront the perturbing lived realities of my research 
subjects and nature of my research endeavours. Reviewing ethnographies of the ‘pains of imprisonment’ 
experienced by male transvestites in the U.S. prisons mediated my distress at the nature, extent and 
causes of the abuse and discriminatory treatment perpetrated in solidarity by heterosexual Malay male 
inmates and guards towards Malay male transvestites in the Singapore prisons (Hanif, 2008a). Similarly, 
preceding ‘gang studies’ made intellectually and emotionally comprehensible the ferocity of armed 
homicides venerated by Omega members in their proclamation of masculinity territoriality and economic 
survivability, and the manipulation of ‘race’ and religion by Omega leaders as ideologies for recruitment 
and promoting gang solidarity (Hanif, 2008b). Armed with insights from the field experience of Venkatesh 
(2008) who was held hostage by the leader of the Black Kings in the Robert Taylor Homes projects and my 
personal ordeal of being stalked by members of a Chinese secret society (Hanif, 2008b), I anticipated a 
rigorous methodology.  
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